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 1 
INTERPRETATIVE AUTHORITY AND THE INTERNATIONAL JUDICIARY 
 
Gleider I Hernández* 
Abstract 
Without a clear delineation of their competences, the indeterminacy latent in 
international law opens up a powerful normative function for international courts with 
respect to the interpretation and development of international law. This chapter seeks to 
identify how international courts work within the system of international law to construct 
interpretative authority, and the limits within which such a claim is constructed. Making the 
claim that an essential role of the judicial engagement with international law is to safeguard 
the coherence of the international legal order, it will conclude with some reflections about 
the responsibility that ought to be assumed by judicial institutions when exercising normative 
authority within the international legal order. 
 
 Keywords: authority, indeterminacy, interpretation, judicial function, normativity 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
International lawyers have claimed authority for international law through defining it as 
an objective science: a discipline through which ‘truth’ about law and legal texts can be 
found. Yet, as with all legal systems, international law carries with it a degree of 
indeterminacy that cannot just be overcome through scientific rigour or the application of 
presumptions. All legal orders are prescriptive, in that they seek to set abstract rules; yet the 
more complex the system, the more frequently one arrives at an instant where the rules are in 
apparent conflict, or where they appear unclear. At the point of application, when the rules are 
determinative of the outcome of a situation, understanding how the claim to legitimacy of the 
interpreter is constructed becomes crucial.  
 
Yet the international legal system seems to avoid questions of how interpretative authority 
is allocated within it. It knows of no centralised judicial function that can discharge the 
systemic function presumed to exist in domestic legal orders; the interpretations of 
international courts and tribunals are in theory no different than an interpretation set down by 
an individual scholar. In practice, however, this is inaccurate for two reasons. First, judicial 
interpretation of legal texts and rules are binding on parties before that judicial institution, and 
thus create subjective legal obligations. Secondly, even if they are not formally law-creative, 
international judicial decisions possess a centrifugal normative force. By this, it is meant that 
other international legal actors tend to follow judicial reasoning faithfully: it is substantively 
constitutive of international law. The situation is exacerbated when dealing with unwritten 
sources of law, in particular customary international law or the nebulous general principles of 
law: there is no balancing between the text, its authors, and the interpreter in such situations, 
and the certainty of judicial reasoning holds an intrinsic appeal and is often used as evidence 
of unwritten law. 
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Judicial institutions play an outsized role in the processes of interpretation. The very 
vagueness of the general rules on the interpretation of positive acts in international law has 
created enormous discretion for judicial institutions, both international and municipal, to 
participate in the interpretation of acts and rules of international law. This situation was 
merely codified with the advent of the Vienna Convention: as Sir Hersch Lauterpacht once 
ventured, ‘almost the entire history of the work of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice could be given in terms of cases arising out of the interpretation of treaties’.1 So too is 
it with the International Court of Justice, and indeed with the bulk of investment arbitration 
awards, the WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body, the ad hoc international 
criminal tribunals, ITLOS and the ICC. The interpretation of acts is thus a quintessential 
judicial activity, and sometimes is assumed by judicial institutions themselves to be a separate 
prong of the judicial function in the international legal order. Accordingly, studying the role 
of judicial institutions, or at least a broader enquiry as to the role of the interpreter, can 
advance the understanding of the function of interpretation and its role within a legal system. 
It is the interpreter who stands in the foreground when a text or rule is interpreted, even when 
the claim is advanced that there is a ‘correct’ interpretation which is presupposed to exist 
independently of the interpreter.
2
 This is the key point to be developed here. 
 
To situate the practice of interpretation within the judicial function is not to suggest that 
judicial institutions are a fortiori the best situated to participate in the interpretation of legal 
rules; instead, it is to recognise that, in practice, that the bulk of the judicial role primarily 
consists in interpreting the acts and rules placed before it when resolving disputes. What 
distinguishes the interpretation of acts by judicial institutions is that these work necessarily 
and formally within the confines of a defined legal system. This is important: the 
interpretation of international law by ‘legal organs’, authorised by the legal system itself, can 
have normative authority.
3
 Again, to recall Lauterpacht, ‘the work of interpretation is one of 
discovering the intention of the parties not only by reference to rules of interpretation, but to 
rules of international law bearing upon the subject-matter of the disputed contractual 
stipulation. These rules may be ready at hand, or they may have to be developed by the 
legitimate methods of judicial activity.’4 In a sense, therefore, the argument favouring the 
judicial role in the interpretation of rules and norms goes further than merely recognising the 
judicial role in interpretation. It suggests that judicial institutions are in fact guardians of the 
very coherence of these rules themselves: they are, as Andrea Bianchi has suggested here, 
very much players in the ‘game’ of interpretation.5 In an indeterminate system like the 
international legal system, this claim has heightened relevance, as according to it, the 
international judiciary would gain an interpretative authority out of proportion with the 
                                                 
1
 H Lauterpacht, The Function of Law in the International Community (Clarendon Press 1933), 108. 
2
 S Jørgensen, ‘Lawyers and Hermeneutics’ (2000) 40 Scandinavian Studies in Law 181, 181. 
3
 H Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (M Knight trans, 2nd edn University of California Press 1970), 355: ‘[t]he 
interpretation of law by the science of law (jurisprudence) must be sharply distinguished as nonauthentic from 
the interpretation by legal organs. Jurisprudential interpretation is purely cognitive ascertainment of the meaning 
of legal norms. In contrast to the interpretation by legal organs, jurisprudential interpretation does not create 
law.’ 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 See A Bianchi, ‘The Game of Interpretation in International Law: the Players, the Cards and Why the Game is 
Worth the Candle’, in this volume. 
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manner in which it discharges its function in practice, especially in relation to the 
development of international law. 
 
As such, the present chapter is a starting-point for a wider project: it aims to identify 
whether there can be some form of wider theorising as to the judicial function in relation to 
interpretation. Are international judges, when interpreting and applying international law, 
making a claim to normative (or semantic) authority? Are they more modest ‘agents’ in the 
international legal process? More ominously, are they cloaking themselves in the formalism 
of classical legal positivism to abdicate political responsibility for the constitutive nature of 
their interpretation? Based both on the self-perception of international judges themselves, but 
also on wider theorising as to the judicial function within a legal order, my claim is that 
international law is ripe for a conceptual re-examination of the international judiciary’s place 
within the interpretative process. The silent claim judges make, through the safeguarding of 
systemic coherence of the legal system they inhabit, must be better understood and cognised 
within the international legal order.  
 
The argument will unfold in the following stages. First, it is important to review some 
tenets of interpretative theory, about the cognition of the law and its application within a 
system by certain categories of actors. Secondly, this essay will highlight how the function of 
interpretation can be distinguished from that of ‘application’ in relation to the judicial 
function. The argument made here is that international judges do not merely enjoy persuasive 
authority by virtue of the quality of their reasoning. It is their particular position, within the 
legal system, that distinguishes the judicial function from other forms of interpretative 
activity. This piece will conclude with some brief thoughts about judicial lawmaking and the 
claim to authority arrogated by judicial institutions. 
 
 
B. INTERPRETATIVE THEORY 
1. A brief word on indeterminacy 
Kelsen’s ‘theory of legal science’, as a project of cognising the law through the methods of 
striving for truth,
6
 did contain certain categorical assertions relating to the nature of the 
interpretative process. Chief amongst these is the claim that participants in legal cognition, be 
they scholars, judges or practitioners, ought to be limited purely to cognising positive acts of 
law and measuring them according to their positive validity.
7
 Yet to do so in international law 
is to conflate positivism with voluntarism;
8
 and Kelsen and other critics of classical legal 
positivism were sufficiently responsive to difficulties with indeterminacy in legal texts. 
Kelsen readily conceded the ‘intentional indefiniteness’ of certain law-applying acts and even 
                                                 
6
 For further discussion, see J Kammerhofer, ‘Hans Kelsen in Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship’, in 
J d’Aspremont and J Kammerhofer (eds.), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (CUP, 
Cambridge, forthcoming 2014), ch 5, 3. 
7
 Ibid 3. 
8
 Ibid 7; J d’Aspremont, ‘Herbert Hart in Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship’, in J. d’Aspremont and J 
Kammerhofer (eds), International Legal Positivism in a Post-Modern World (Cambridge University Press 
2014), ch 6, 22, suggests that reductionism is indifferent as to the material source of the law, concerning itself 
only with its formal validity. 
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the unintended indefiniteness inherent in the linguistic formulation of legal norms.
9
 His vision 
of the legal system was that it formed a ‘frame’ that admitted of possible applications of 
norms in concrete cases
10
 the act of individual application helped further to determine and 
constitute a general legal rule.
11
 Kelsen’s critique of classical legal positivism questioned the 
idea that the act of interpretation was nothing but an act of understanding and clarification: he 
situated it as an act of will or cognition: a choice.
12
 This characterisation renders untenable 
any categorical distinction, within a given frame, between law-creation and law-application 
by law-applying actors: to him, these were also law-making acts.
13
 His solution was to admit 
of the constitutive nature of discretion, in the application of such rules, by law-applying 
authorities in a legal system. Similarly, Hart conceded a certain place for discretion in a legal 
system whose rules were sufficiently determinate to supply standards of correct judicial 
decision,
14
 although he also foresaw that hard cases helped to prove a fundamental 
‘incompleteness’ in law, where the law could provide no answer.15 This is in part because 
Hart’s theory was essentially reductionist16 in so far as it tried to confine itself to describing 
how law and a legal system could arrive at the validity of rules, and not on the determinacy of 
the legal order itself. 
 
It is well-known that Ronald Dworkin rejected the idea that the law could be incomplete 
and contain gaps, choosing instead a view that law is not incomplete and indeterminate, being 
supplemented by principles, principles that can themselves be derived from moral 
justifications if necessary.
17
 This would have been inadmissible to Kelsen: ‘[i]t is, from a 
scientific and hence objective point of view, inadmissible to proclaim as solely correct an 
interpretation that from a subjectively political viewpoint is more desirable than another, 
logically equally possible, interpretation. For in that case, a purely political value judgment is 
falsely presented as scientific truth.’18 In any event, what is interesting about Dworkin is that 
the discretion exercised in the interpretative act requires the construction and balancing of the 
principles underlying legal rules, a ‘weak’ form of discretion exercised within the ‘open 
texture’19 of a legal system. Legal interpretation would then become an act of cognising the 
                                                 
9
 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 3) 350. 
10
 Ibid 351. 
11
 Ibid 349. 
12
 Ibid 82-3. 
13
 Ibid 85. See also I Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law: Between Normative Twists and 
Semantic Authority (Oxford University Press 2012), 31. 
14
 HLA Hart, The Concept of Law (2
nd
 edn Clarendon Press 1994), 145. Hart’s reliance on specifically judicial 
discretion was premised on his view that judges are law-applying officials within a given legal system; and thus 
specifically entrusted with safeguarding that system. 
15
 Ibid 252. 
16
 d’Aspremont’s term: see ‘Herbert Hart in Post-Modern International Legal Scholarship’ (n 8), 2, passim. 
17
 Cf. Hart, The Concept of Law (n 14) 204-5, denying the legality of recourse to moral justification. 
18
 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 3) 356.  
19
 R Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Harvard University Press 1978), 31-2. He distinguished his form of 
‘weak’ discretion from the ‘strong’ discretion that he purported Kelsen and Hart attributed to judges, which 
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possibilities available within the frame of the system;
20
 in this respect at least, it is 
reconcilable with Kelsen and Hart, in that it also situates the interpretative process within the 
frame of a legal system. With respect to international law, such limits are part of its inner 
logic, and its inherent structural biases that are deeply embedded within the international legal 
system itself.
21
  
 
Read in this light, Hart’s suggestion, that certain theorists are ‘prepared to ignore any 
actual decisions of judges which run counter to their own logical calculations’,22 suggests a 
certain faith in judicial decisions, as being the expression of a legal text, and thus establishing 
the validity of a claim.
23
 
 
 
2. Limits to indeterminacy 
Although the indeterminacy of legal language is in many respects presumed, it does not 
allow for unlimited choices in how interpretation shapes and constructs the meaning of a text. 
Within that indeterminacy comes a measure of determinacy; the ‘canonical terms’ within a 
legal text provide a limit to the political choices available to the interpreter. He or she cannot 
arrive at interpretations that clearly offend the actual words used, or that are justified by 
policies and principles wholly absent from the canonical terms.
24
 Certainly the text is the ‘first 
authoritative reference point’25 through which the interpretation of a norm is constructed; but 
the text is not reducible to a fixed, immutable expression of the rule. What is more, the 
engagement of actors with a legal text is historically contingent: it is structured by the frame 
in which it is situated, and measured against rules contained within that frame, not to mention 
past practices of other actors or disputants.
26
 As such, rule understanding is a situated 
                                                                                                                                                        
allowed them to reach for principles outside a legal system. Dworkin’s point is fair. If one examines Kelsen, 
Pure Theory of Law (n 3) 352, his refusal to privilege any acceptable meaning within the frame is evident: 
‘[f]rom the point of view of positive law, one method is exactly as good as the other’. Similarly Hart, The 
Concept of Law (n 14) 204-5, admits that the interpretation of legal texts and precedents by judges leaves open a 
‘vast field’ for judicial law-creation, yet gives few indicia as to what standards should guide judges should the 
legal rules in question be ambiguous.  
20
 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 3) 351.  
21
 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the Structure of International Legal Argument (reissue by 
Cambridge University Press 2005), 568. 
22
 HLA Hart, Essays in Philosophy and Jurisprudence (Oxford University Press 1984), 268. 
23
 Beckett suggests that the United Kingdom House of Lords’ Pinochet judgment (R v. Bow Street Metropolitan 
Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3), [2000] 1 AC 147, and the Canadian Supreme Court’s 
Re Secession of Quebec (1996) 161 DLR (4
th
) 385, despite the obvious lack of expertise of either of those 
domestic courts in PIL, are regarded as ‘authoritative’ determinations on the customary nature of the prohibition 
on torture. Any teacher of international law is likely to be regarded with similar suspicion in this respect. As 
Beckett, ‘Fragmentation, Openness, and Hegemony’, p. 65 wryly notes, ‘[l]awyers, in short, like cases!’. 
24
 Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (n 13) 5. 
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid 49. 
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activity.
27
 But radical subjectivism has its limits as well; some are rooted in the language of 
law itself.
28
 Although inter-subjective meanings and the exercise of discretion are in some 
respects the essence of subjectivism, legal materials are neither intrinsically determinate nor 
indeterminate.
29
 Owen Fiss’ idea of ‘dynamic interaction between reader and text’ comes to 
mind here.
30
 
 
If the process of legal interpretation and application is a form of practical reasoning, it 
must take place within the confines of rational legal argument: to claim that an interpretation 
is correct implies that the legal decision being sought or justified is rationally defensible: it is 
plausible in the context of the legal system.
31
 Through a ‘rational reconstruction’ of legal 
materials, an interpreter arrives at a decision and justifies it through consistent reasoning, 
which must conform to the grammar of legal discourse.
32
 It is the essence of the third-party 
decider’s role not that they ask themselves as to the correctness or reasonableness of primary 
rules, but rather, whether and how such primary rules can be applied to the specific context of 
a case before them.
33
 This suggests that the drive for coherence is a presumption that must be 
addressed. To argue the opposite demands a more difficult burden of justification: the 
interpreter must prove why the norms and rules under competing regimes do not constitute a 
rational approach to the problem at hand.
34
 Or one could go as far as Robert Cover, who 
suggested that coherent legal meaning is an element in legal interpretation, not as an end in 
                                                 
27
 O Korhonen, International Law Situated: An Analysis of the Lawyer’s Stance Towards Culture, History and 
Community (Kluwer 2000).  
28
 Ricoeur would suggest that whilst ‘it is true that there is always more than one way of construing a text, it is 
not true that all interpretations are equal and may be assimilated to so-called rules of thumb. The text is a limited 
field of possible constructions’. P Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, vol II (Northwestern 
University Press, 1991), 160. See also WN Eskridge and PP Frickey, ‘Statutory Interpretation as Practical 
Reasoning’ (1990) 42 Stanford Law Review 321, 382: ‘[a]lthough interpretation is neither objective nor 
predictable, it is bounded … The historical text itself constrains, for the interpreter is charged with learning from 
the text and working from it to the current problem. Moreover, the interpreter’s perspective is charged with 
learning from the text and working from it to the current problem. Moreover, the interpreter’s perspective itself 
is conditioned by tradition—the evolution of the historical text as it has been interpreted, the values of society, 
and current circumstances. While these constraints certainly do not dictate a result, the interpreter cannot 
disregard the force of that which envelops and situates her in present society.’ 
29
 See D Kennedy, ‘A Left Phenomenological Critique of the Hart/Kelsen Theory of Legal Interpretation’ in E. 
Cáceres et al (eds), Problemas Contemporáneos de la Filosofia de Derecho (UNAM 2005) 371, 380-1. 
30
 O Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739. 
31
 D Pulkowski, The Law and Politics of International Regime Conflict (Oxford University Press 2014), 252. 
32
 N MacCormick, ‘Risking Constitutional Collision in Europe?’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
556. See also JM Balkin, ‘Understanding Legal Understanding: The Legal Subject and the Problem of Legal 
Coherence’ (1993) 103 Yale Law Journal 105: ‘[t]he experience of legal coherence is the result of our attempt to 
understand law through the process of rational reconstruction. … To rationally reconstruct the law is to attempt 
to understand the substantive rationality emanating from it.’ 
33
 J Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy (MIT 
Press 1998), 267. 
34
 Pulkowski, International Regime Conflict (n 31) 255. 
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itself, but because the privileging of a certain interpretation displaces other possible 
alternatives, and always with a view to the coherence of the overall legal system.
35
 
 
Therefore, the outer limits that mark the field of possible interpretations may be recognised 
in an act of scientific legal cognition by capable legal scholars;
36
 but true to the Kantian 
inspiration of Kelsen’s legal theory, the concrete meaning of a norm in the individually 
disputed case cannot be discovered but only created. This is broadly consonant with Hart’s 
social thesis, where the claim to authority of an interpretative act is determined by adherence 
to the standards of legal argument and interpretation that are accepted by officials within that 
system.
37
 Understood thus, interpretation is a relatively open exercise taking place within a 
confined setting, a setting defined by the four corners of the text itself.
38
 Even in classical 
legal positivism there is a certain openness based in the language used in constructing a text: 
‘[b]y virtue of linguistic openness, legal positivism in its purest form is never immune to such 
changes in meaning and to the consequent informal development of law’.39 As such, the 
theoretical possibilities of reasonable meaning—and thus, the contestability of meaning—are 
constrained by these practical limits, which would confirm the binding force of international 
law.
40
 
 
The space opened by indeterminacy opens up a powerful normative function for judiciaries. 
Hart was adamant that ‘once the myths which obscure the nature of the judicial processes are 
dispelled by realistic study, it is patent … that the open texture of law leaves a vast field for a 
creative activity which some call legislative.’41 Judges, as agents of the system, work within 
that system: they are guided to safeguard the purpose of the rules that they are interpreting; 
they do not have to make blind and arbitrary judgments, or reduce themselves to ‘mechanical’ 
deduction.  
 
Agency within the system distinguishes the judicial function from that of legal scholars, or 
activists. To Dworkin, ‘the interpretive attitude cannot survive unless members of the same 
interpretive community share at least roughly the same assumptions’ about ‘what counts as 
part of the practice’.42 Dworkin’s theories have been taken to be less a theory of law than a 
theory of adjudication: but it is in that theory of adjudication that Dworkin situates 
interpretation—the most powerful weapon in a judge’s arsenal—to participate in the 
development of that legal system. The opposite position is that proposed by Ian Johnstone: 
‘Interpretive authority … resides in neither the text nor the reader individually, but with the 
                                                 
35
 R Cover, ‘Nomos and Narrative’ (1983) 97 Harvard Law Review 4, 47. 
36
 H Kelsen, General Theory of Norms (Clarendon Press 1991), 44. 
37
 R Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Hart 1986), 67. 
38
 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 19) 108-109. 
39
 U Fastenrath, ‘Relative Normativity in International Law’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 
315, 316. 
40
 Venzke, How Interpretation Makes International Law (n 13) 49. 
41
 Hart, The Concept of Law (n 14) 204. 
42
 Dworkin, Law’s Empire (n 37). 67. 
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community of professionals engaged in the enterprise of treaty interpretation and 
implementation.’43 Owen Fiss, within the American domestic context, situates the relevant 
interpretive community as the judiciary, ‘by virtue of their office’, which carries with it a 
‘commitment to uphold and advance the rule of law itself’.44 The claim of authority is 
therefore extrinsic to the process of interpretation,
45
 and in fact somewhat grounded on any 
meta-law on sources; in short, the claim is not one of intellectual cogency, but formal 
legitimacy: the judicial office automatically confers authority on the interpretation issued 
therefrom. The same reasoning cannot obtain at the international level, for the international 
judiciary, formally at least, does not occupy a similar hierarchical position.
46
 
 
3. Authenticity in interpretation and the authority of the interpreter 
a. Concept of ‘authentic interpretation’ 
The concept of ‘authentic interpretation’,47 as representing an interpretation on which all 
parties were agreed, was first mentioned in the case law of the PCIJ. Judge Hudson drew a 
distinction between interpretation and application, and the function of interpretation more 
generally: he saw it as imperative that ‘the definitely entertained and expressed intentions of 
the parties should be effectuated’,48 thus privileging the natural meaning of terms over 
consideration of purpose. He also distilled a few practices from the case law of the PCIJ that 
came to be embodied in Articles 32-33 VCLT; notably, its reliance on preparatory works to 
confirm interpretations over which it had no doubt.
49
  
b. Identity of the interpreter in theory of international law 
What became Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention prescribed the methods of treaty 
interpretation but not who was to interpret them; a point not lost even within the International 
Law Commission.
50
 This is an old question: in Jaworzina, the Permanent Court indicated that 
                                                 
43
 I Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation: the Authority of Interpretive Communities’ (1990-1991) 12 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 371,  372. 
44
 O Fiss, ‘Objectivity and Interpretation’ (1982) 34 Stanford Law Review 739, 754; criticised as a ‘theory of 
judicial interpretation’ by S Fish, ‘Fiss v. Fish’, (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 1325. 
45
 Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation’ (n 43) 375.  
46
 See J Stone, ‘Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation: A Study in the International Judicial Process’ (1954) 
1 Sydney Law Review 344, 364; R Falk, ‘On Treaty Interpretation and the New Haven Approach: Achievements 
and Prospects’ (1967–1968) 8 Virginia Journal of International Law 323, 326; and on the ‘communicative’ 
judicial function, see Johnstone, ‘Treaty Interpretation’ (n 43) 375-76. 
47
 MO Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice 1920-1942 (Macmillan, New York, 1943), 640-1; 
see also O Spiermann, International Legal Argument in the Permanent Court of International Justice: The Rise 
of the International Judiciary (Cambridge University Press 2005), 236-7. 
48
 Ibid 643-4. 
49
 Ibid 653-4. Cf Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (Georgia v Russian Federation) (Preliminary Objections) [2011] ICJ Rep 70, where the Court 
used the travaux préparatoires of CERD to confirm the interpretation that it had already given: para 142. 
50
 See intervention by Mr Tsuruoka, [1964] Yearbook of the International Law Commission, vol  I, 280, para 72. 
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‘… it is an established principle that the right of giving an authoritative interpretation of a 
legal rule belongs solely to the person or body who has the power to modify or suppress it’.51 
It is inherent in the process of interpretation itself, as treaties between States almost invariably 
provide that questions of interpretation and application of a treaty are to be resolved by a third 
party.
52
 
 
The real question is not who most often interprets and applies treaties, which invariably 
concerns the parties to the treaty most; the conceptually interesting question arises when there 
are diverging views on the interpretation of an obligation, and whether there is a hierarchy of 
authority. In other words, whose interpretation can be regarded as authoritative? The judicial 
(or at the very least, the ‘impartial third party’) role there comes to be acutely important, as it 
conditions both the practice of States in contracting obligations.
53
 
c.  ‘Authoritative interpretation’ formalised 
Authoritative interpretation in the classic sense is a relevant consensual undertaking, 
where consent is given by the parties, and the interpreter operating on the basis of delegated 
authority.
54
 But what of situations where that authority is not delegated clearly, for example, 
with rules of customary international law, or general principles of law? Can one genuinely say 
that there is authoritative interpretation writ large, or for general international law?  
 
The openness of the interpretative process leads directly to a consideration of the limits 
of legal order in international society; in short, if the interpretative act is properly understood, 
there is no way for an international tribunal to render an authoritative judgment.
55
 Yet 
                                                 
51
 Delimitation of the Polish-Czechoslovakian Frontier (Question of Jaworzina), PCIJ Advisory Opinion, Series 
B, No 8, at 37. Ruda raised this in the ILC as well: see 765
th
 meeting (14 July 1964), in [1964] Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission, vol I, 277, para 34: ‘[i]nterpretation occurred at two different levels. First, as 
between States, the only legally valid interpretation of a treaty was the authentic interpretation by the parties to 
the treaty. The other level was that of interpretation by arbitration, for which there were fundamental principles 
…’ 
52
 Although R Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2007), 109 makes the point, he does not 
link it conceptually.  
53
 See eg The Restatement of the Law (Third), The Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law 
Institute 1987), 3: ‘…this Restatement represents the opinion of The American Law Institute as to the rules that 
an impartial tribunal would apply if charged with deciding a controversy in accordance with international law’. 
[Emphasis added.] 
54
 G Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaties of Treaty Interpretation: Articles 27–29 of the Vienna 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (1968) 9 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 11; A McNair, The 
Law of Treaties (2
nd
 edn Clarendon Press 1961), 531-532. This has to be distinguished from Kelsen’s idea of 
‘authentic’ interpretation (as distinguished from ‘scientific’ interpretation): as J Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in 
International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective (Routledge 2011), 115 describes Kelsen’s concept, authentic 
interpretation is performed by organs authorised by the law to apply it; the result of authentic interpretation is a 
norm, or a law-creating act; authentic interpretation is an act of will, whereas scholarly interpretation is an act of 
cognition; ‘one determining what is law, the other finding the law’. He then makes the claim (with which the 
present author disagrees) that ‘[b]ecause an act of will is necessary for the creation of positive law, authentic 
interpretation as law-creation must be an act of will; mere cognition cannot create norms’. On short, one needs 
an act of volition, not merely an act of cognition; and the question is whose act of volition is creative of law. 
55
 Falk, ‘On Treaty Interpretation’ (n 46) 336. 
 10 
whatever the (lack of) formal authority, the reality is that some interpretations are simply 
more authoritative than others: they carry with them the idea of normativity. In so doing, the 
claim to authority gives a target audience the comfort of precedent, of black robes, of 
objectivity; legal scholars shy away from engaging in meaningful and original criticism when 
we can hide behind these alluring sources. In this respect, despite the fact that the third-party 
interpreter settling a dispute (an ‘authorised organ’) decides, thus on some level applying the 
law (unlike the scholar, who merely ‘cognises’56), one must reject the Kelsenite conceit that 
this renders nugatory any normative effect any ‘non-authorised’ interpretation may have.57 
Serge Sur attempted to distinguish between ‘doctrinal’ and ‘juridical’ interpretation on the 
same basis; the former had as its wider aim the understanding of the international legal order, 
the latter, by ‘qualified legal agents’, was only interested in its functioning.58 But the 
distinction was not hermetic: ‘juridical’ interpretation was a combination of ‘cognition’ and 
‘will’, fusing the doctrinal with the functional to favour one particular solution.59 
 
 
 
C. THE FALLACY IN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION DISTINCTION  
 
The distinction between ‘application’ and ‘interpretation’ was first articulated in the Harvard 
draft convention on the law of treaties, which provided that: 
 
Interpretation is closely connected with the carrying out of treaties, for before a treaty can be applied in a given 
set of circumstances it must be determined whether or not it was meant to apply to those circumstances … In 
any particular case there may be no expressed doubt or difference of opinion as to the meaning of the treaty 
concerned; its purpose and applicability may be regarded as perfectly evident. Yet, even in such a case, the 
person or persons deciding that the meaning of the treaty is ‘clear’, and that it is plainly intended to apply to 
the given circumstances, must do so, consciously or unconsciously, by some process of reasoning based upon 
evidence. 
 
In short, the ‘application’ of treaties, it would seem, must almost inevitably involve some measure of 
‘interpretation’. There is, however, a recognized distinction between the two processes. Interpretation is the 
                                                 
56
 Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law (n 54) 106. 
57
 Ibid citing H Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of its Fundamental Problems 
(London Institute of World Affairs 1950), xvi: ‘Non-authentic interpretation of the law, that is interpretation by 
persons not authorised by the law itself, is legally as irrelevant as the judgment of a private person on the guilt 
or innocence of an individual accused before a competent court of having committed a crime.’ This is 
emphatically not the case in international law: to give equally simple (and even trite!) examples of when ‘non-
authorised interpretation’ created serious doctrinal controversy and threatened to change the law: when Chile 
extended its exclusive economic zone to 200 nautical miles; when the ICTY threw down its ‘overall control’ test 
in Prosecutor v Tadić (Judgement), Case No IT-94-1-A, (1999) 38 ILM 1518; when the House of Lords in 
Regina v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate And Others, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 
AC 147, [1999] 2 All ER 97,   constructed a doctrine of implied waiver to extradite General Pinochet to Spain 
on charges of torture; and when the Italian Court of Cassation in Ferrini v Federal Republic of Germany, 
Decision No 5044/2004, 128 ILR 658 disregarded the jurisdictional immunity of Germany. All of these cases 
led to serious wrangling and a realignment by States of how they perceived customary international law. In 
short, whatever the correctness of any of these acts, and even if they failed to change the law in substance, their 
potential for normativity (actualised in some cases!) is manifest. Kelsen was wrong.  
58
 S Sur, L’interprétation en droit international public (LGDJ 1974), 98. 
59
 Ibid 98-99. 
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process of determining the meaning of a text; application is the process of determining the consequences 
which, according to the text, should follow in a given situation.
60
 
 
It is arguable that interpretation and application can be easily distinguished through their 
outcomes: as Schwarzenberger asserted in 1968, ‘[i]nterpretation is the process of establishing 
the legal character and effects of a consensus achieved by the parties. In contrast, application 
is the process of determining the consequences of such an interpretation in a concrete case.’61 
To Schwarzenberger’s mind, interpretation is thus ‘independent of, and need not be followed 
by, the application of the treaty’,62 therefore clearly delineating a doctrinal function for 
interpretation distinct from the judicial function of application. Although he did acknowledge 
that any application of a treaty, ‘including its execution, presupposes, however, a preceding 
conscious or subconscious interpretation of the treaty’.63 This view would, argues Ulf 
Linderfalk, reduce international courts and arbitration tribunals to police, civil servants and 
military officials: they are all (in his terms) ‘appliers’ of international law.64 
 
The judicial role in all of this becomes clear: under the orthodox positivist view, judicial 
interpretation and application are to be nothing more than to fulfil the Montesquieuesque role 
to ‘speak the law’ (jus dicere, dire la loi). Whatever language was used, ‘interpretation was 
always present as a supplement to the judicial truth-saying role. Power over truth.’65 And yet, 
reality has always been quite different: 
 
‘Application’ of the law … was the repository of power, in service of interpretation as interpretation 
served the law. These relations do divide truth from power and can be seen to deny power. But it is more 
accurate to think of the discourse as managing a shifting place for power within the liberal order. 
‘Interpretation’ in traditional liberal legal discourse endangered the serenity of truth-disguised power as it 
reinforced that hegemony by both domesticating and diverting acknowledgment of judicial action.
66
  
                                                 
60
 29 (1935) AJIL Supplement 938 (see also Gardiner (n 52) ch 2, s 4, for comments on the Harvard Convention 
generally). 
61
 G Schwarzenberger, ‘Myths and Realities of Treaties of Treaty Interpretation: Articles 27-29 of the Vienna 
Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties’, (1968) 9 Virginia Journal of International Law 1, 7, citing the 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Ehrlich in Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity: 
Jurisdiction), [1927] PCIJ Series A, No 9, at 39.  
62
 Ibid 8, citing Case concerning certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Merits), [1926] PCIJ Series 
A, No 7, pp. 18-19. 
63
 Ibid 8, citing Mavrommatis Jerusalem Concessions, [1925] PCIJ Series A, No. 5, 47-48. This was also the 
language used by the Harvard Draft on the Law of Treaties, p. 938; and cited approvingly on this point by J 
d’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law: A Theory on the Ascertainment of Legal Rules 
(OUP, Oxford, 2011), p. 157. But cf. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anzilotti in Interpretation of the 1919 
Convention concerning Employment of Women During the Night (Advisory Opinion of 15 November 1932), 
PCIJ Ser. A/B, No. 50 (1932), 383: ‘[i] Article 3, according to the natural meaning of its terms, were really 
perfectly clear, it would be hardly admissible to endeavour to find an interpretation other than that which flows 
from the natural meaning of its terms. But I do not see how it is possible to say that an article of a convention is 
clear until the subject and the aim of the convention have been ascertained, for the article only assumes its true 
import in this convention and in relation thereto.’ 
64
 U Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties: The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer 2007), 1. 
65
 D Kennedy, ‘The Turn to Interpretation’ 58 Southern California Law Review (1985) 251, 253. 
66
 Ibid. 
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To fixate on interpretation merely as a ‘clarifying operation’,67 one aiming merely at 
understanding or lending meaning to a text, is a distinctive feature of the orthodox positive 
view, which presumes there to exist some ‘correct’ or ‘proper’ interpretative process. That 
view does not, for example, take account of the active role of the interpreter within the 
interpretative act, and reinforces the sense that interpretation as a process serves only to 
uncover what is objectively true. As Lauterpacht suggests, ‘… there is nothing easier than to 
purport to give the appearance of legal respectability and plausibility—by the simple 
operation of selecting one or more rules of interpretation—to a judicial decision which is 
lacking in soundness, in impartiality, or in intellectual vigour.’68 Accordingly, even the 
process of identifying legal norms requires a choice as to which theory of sources one 
privileges, which demonstrates how the claim to objectivity in law-identification can be 
problematic.
69
 
 
In this respect, it almost does not whether one favours an approach to judicial 
interpretation that serves to constrain or to empower a judge, for example, invoking 
overarching principles such as restrictive interpretation or of ‘effectiveness’. The real issue is 
that any such overarching principle temporarily privileges an imaginary displacement of 
judicial power, be it in favour or against judicial discretion. But each is defined by connection 
of the judge to the truth, be truth a matter either of text or merely of the effects generated by a 
judicial decision.
70
 The rules of interpretation are ‘not the determining cause of judicial 
decisions, but the form in which the judge cloaks a result arrived at by other means’.71 
 
Look, then at the normative move proposed in Lauterpacht’s deliberate tie between 
interpretation and adjudication. Lauterpacht’s concept of law upheld the centrality of the 
judicial function within any legal system, in terms that would suggest that the judicial 
function served to ensure that the values and priorities embodied within the legal system 
would be generally respected. It was not to act mechanically: 
 
‘[t]he judicial function is not that of an automaton which registers a gap, an obscurity, an 
absurdity, a frustrated purpose, without an attempt to fill the lacunae by reference to the intentions 
of the parties in the wider context of the agreement as a whole and the circumstances 
accompanying its adoption, to the needs of the community, and to the requirement of good faith. ... 
                                                 
67
 McNair, The Law of Treaties (n 54) 365, fn 1: ‘[t]he words “interpret”, “interpretation” are often used loosely 
as if they included “apply, application”. Strictly speaking, when the meaning of the treaty is clear, it is 
“applied”, not “interpreted”. Interpretation is a secondary process which only comes into play when it is 
impossible to make sense of the plain terms of the treaty, or when they are susceptible of different meanings. 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary says: ‘Interpret: expound the meaning of (abstruse words, writings, &c.); make 
out the meaning of.’ [Emphasis added.] But cf Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (n 52) 27: ‘… it is difficult to see 
how this sustains the distinction … between the circumstances for interpretation and for application, and the 
relation [McNair] attributes to them. … This sets on its head the natural sequence that is inherent in the process 
of reading a treaty: first ascribing meaning to its terms and then applying the outcome to a particular situation.’  
68
 Lauterpacht, Function of Law (n 1) 53. 
69
 J Beckett, ‘Countering Uncertainty and Ending Up/Down Arguments: Prolegomena to a Response to NAIL’, 
(2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 16 213. 
70
 Kennedy, ‘The Turn to Interpretation’ (n 65) 253. 
71
 H.Lauterpacht, ‘Restrictive Interpretation and the Principle of Effectiveness in the Interpretation of Treaties’ 
(1949) 26 British Year Book of International Law, 53. 
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But … that quasi-legislative function ought not to be so deliberate or so drastic as to give 
justifiable ground for the reproach that the tribunal has substituted its own intention for that of the 
parties.’  
 
Defining the judicial function as ‘quasi-legislative’, even in the absence of an international 
legislative body or process, goes beyond merely to affirm the centrality of the judicial 
function within the legal system. It is a statement that affirms, in terms redolent of Ronald 
Dworkin, that the judicial function exists not only as a guardian of the coherence of the legal 
system, but equally as the guardian of the wider interests of the political community, even 
when these have not necessarily been embodied into law. They become, to use Dworkin’s 
terms, a ‘deputy legislature’ rather than a ‘deputy to the legislature’,72 in the sense that law-
creation, using the methods and techniques of interpretation, becomes regarded as legitimate 
judicial activity.  
 
Yet, even in the distinction between operative interpretation (those who apply) the law 
and ‘doctrinal’ interpretation (those who consider and study the law),73 the role of the 
interpreter is often over-simplified. Scholars concerned with interpretation, by examining 
merely what a judge has decided when he or she says the law, but without questioning the 
process of judicial decision and the methods used to settle a dispute, are engaging in 
apologetic scholarship. What is meant by apologetic scholarship is that they are in essence 
domesticating judicial activity and distracting attention from judicial power; this destabilises 
the patterns of traditional judicial discourse, as it privileges description rather than critical 
scrutiny. Julius Stone was correct in decrying the canonist rhetoric as fundamentally 
apologist, obscuring the judicial function in interpretation through a veneer of objectivity: ‘the 
appearance of an objective decision based on compulsive legal directives, where in reality no 
legal compulsion does exist.
74
 In so doing, judicial interpretation can be imagined as 
simultaneously more and less constrained than judicial application; the process of 
interpretation was both prior to and in service of substance.
75
 The purpose of this subterfuge: 
‘to disarm the still prevalent prejudice against judicial law-making’,76 whatever the ambiguity 
intentionally or accidentally provided by the parties.
77
 
                                                 
72
 Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (n 19), 83. 
73
 Linderfalk, Interpretation (n 64)12. 
74
 J Stone, ‘Fictional Elements in Treaty Interpretation: A Study in the International Judicial Process’ (1954) 1 
Sydney Law Review 334, 364. At 347, he went further: ‘[i]t is notorious that … treaty terms may often be 
intended, not to express the consensus reached, but rather to conceal the failure to reach one. In multilateral 
instruments, especially political ones, that agreed content expressed by the terms may be far less important than 
the non-agreed terms concealed by them. When a case arises involving the non-agreed content of the treaty, 
interpretation of the terms, even if purporting to find the intention of the parties is not in fact doing so. “The 
imputation of intention in such a case is a fiction concealing the true nature of the activity’. 
75
 Kennedy, ‘The Turn to Interpretation’ (n 65) 253. 
76
 Stone, ‘Fictional Elements’ (n 74) 349. At 358, Stone suggests that the exercise of institutional rule-creation is 
obscured behind assumed intention, with the consequence of ‘exercising power without the acceptance of 
responsibility for it’. 
77
 The critique proffered by MS McDougal, HD Lasswell, and JC Miller, The Interpretation of Agreements and 
World Public Order: Principles of Content and Procedure (Yale University Press 1967), 264-5, is interesting: 
‘[i]t is highly unlikely that international tribunals will be adequately protected against ‘premature strains’ by 
‘fictions’; neither the participants in processes of decision nor scholarly observers are likely to be tranquilized 
by attempts to “conceal judicial creativeness” by such evasions, even if skillful.’ 
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Indeed, as Beckett cautions, ‘[w]ho describes and who decides are interrelated, 
cumulative, problems. The question of expertise gives way to one of epistemic authority, the 
need to decide, and thus to appropriation by the authoritative discourse’.78 And as 
Koskenniemi explains, knowledge of the forum in which a dispute will be decided is 
tantamount to knowledge of the decision which will be made.
79
  
 
There is a better view: judgments and actions are ‘commitments that are subject to a 
kind of normative assessment, as correct or incorrect’.80 They are a commitment to legal 
rationality and to the view that the legal aspects of issues can be resolved in isolation, if only 
the application of the ‘correct’ rules can be made.  Judicial interpretation does not carry with 
it the same weight as that of the military commander, for example; as an exercise, it is a 
fusion of both operational and doctrinal interpretation, given the claim to heightened authority 
of judicial interpretations, not to mention its application to a concrete set of facts, and finally 
enhanced by the normative weight to be given. The so-called ‘validity of the interpretation 
result’ is therefore not limited to the factual situation at hand, but carries normative 
repercussions for the legal order as a whole—whether that judicial interpretation is purely 
international or on the domestic plane. ‘Precision’ in this sense merely confuses the result—
the reality is that however precise a judicial institution will aim to be, scholars and 
practitioners will naturally gravitate towards judicial decisions to lend them guidance, 
especially in a legal order where room is allowed for indeterminacy and a degree of 
incoherence.  
 
The claim of judicial institutions to a heightened role in the interpretation of legal 
rules, or even to ‘authoritative interpretation’, remains highly contentious, not least because of 
the systematic constraints that permeate the work of international courts. Judicial institutions 
remain accountable to States externally, through their limited jurisdiction (whether optional 
jurisdiction, or jurisdiction limited ratione personae or ratione materiae), and internally, 
through the processes of nomination and selection of judges to the international bench.
81
 If 
one accepts the nature of international law as a law of coexistence at least in part, and one also 
accepts Kolb’s premise that the interpretative act is also capable of developing the 
international law on the matter, then the role of judicial institutions must be conceptually 
limited, as States must continue to hold at least a default or first-order role in the 
interpretation of the obligations which they themselves have entered.
82
 Even if one makes the 
                                                 
78
 J Beckett, ‘Fragmentation, Openness, and Hegemony: Adjudication and the WTO’ in MK Lewis, S Frankel 
(eds), International Economic Law and National Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2010) 44, 56. 
79
 M Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ (2007) 70 Modern 
Law Review 1, 8. 
80
 R Brandom, ‘Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism: Negotiation and Administration in Hegel’s 
Account of the Structure and Content of Conceptual Norms’ (1999) 7 European Journal of Philosophy 164, 
165-6. 
81
 These constraints are aptly summed up in a previous work by the present author: see GI Hernández, 
‘Impartiality, Bias, and the International Court of Justice’, (2012) 1(3) Cambridge Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 183. 
82
 This is an issue coming to the fore in the realm of international investment law, where the decentralised (and 
voluminous) resolution of disputes by arbitral awards has led to wider debates as to the role of investment 
tribunals and their awards as a source of law: see eg A Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration: The Dual Role of States’ (2010) 104 American Journal of International Law 179, esp. 188 et seq.  
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argument that States could have delegated their first-order role in the interpretation of 
obligations to judicial institutions when they consented to their jurisdiction, the constraints on 
these adjudicatory bodies has resulted in such judicial institutions hewing, broadly speaking, 
to the views of States. 
 
Finally, it is important, within the context of the claim to interpretative authority 
advanced by international courts, to remain cognisant of the targeted audience. The effective 
authority commanded by a court is reliant on the ability to persuade the wider audience of 
international society; as Bianchi has explained, the court can only be regarded as persuasive if 
it calibrates its argument precisely to appeal to its target audience.
83
 In international law, that 
audience is not merely the parties before the judicial institution, but equally, future and 
potential parties, other international courts, and to an extent, the views of other members of 
the ‘epistemic community’ of international lawyers.84 
 
In this respect, the idea of a ‘syntax’ common to international lawyers suggested by 
Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘qui autorise la creation et la validité des normes’85 which would 
emanate from functionally different specialised regimes in international law, could be very 
useful. This idea of syntax, of a common grammatical code, would serve to distinguish 
international law from other legal orders (or, for that matter, from other normative orders). 
And this idea of commonality also has a darker side: to privilege systemic unity and 
coherence over other priorities, and deigns to presume, or if necessary, construct the 
existence of norms that resolve normative conflicts, impose a hierarchy of norms, and if 
necessary, even harkens back to the ultimate rule or Grundnorm that will legitimate the entire 
legal order. It is, in some respects, the conceit of the epistemic community of international 
lawyers that our international legal system can and necessarily must take this form: 
 
A professionally competent argument is rooted in a social concept of law—it claims to emerge 
from the way international society is, and not from some wishful construction of it. On the other 
hand, any such doctrine or position must also show that it is not just a reflection of power—that it 
does not only tell what States do or will but what they should do or will.
86
 
 
The final focus of this piece is on how the methods and forms of interpretation 
constitute a claim to wider normative authority by judicial institutions. The wider question of 
the identity and function of the interpreter does seem generally to be an area of enquiry which 
most major recent books on interpretation (Orakhelashvili, Kolb and Gardiner, with perhaps 
Linderfalk’s linguistic analysis, and excluding of course Venzke) seem to have ignored. 
Accordingly, the role judicial interpreters themselves play in interpretation in lawmaking will 
be briefly discussed. 
                                                 
83
 Bianchi (n 5) 4. 
84
 The concept of ‘epistemic communities’ is understood here in the same sense as in A Bianchi, ‘Gazing at the 
Crystal Ball (again): State Immunity and Jus Cogens beyond Germany v Italy’ (2013) 4 Journal of International 
Dispute Settlement 1.  
85
 P-M Dupuy, ‘L’unité de l’ordre juridique international’ (2002) 297 Recueil des Cours 1. A similar idea of 
‘discourse rules of international law—a grammar for communicative interaction’ was put forward in Pulkowski, 
International Regime Conflict (n 31) 238. 
86
 M Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument (CUP reissue, 
Cambridge 2006), Epilogue, 573-4. 
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D. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION AND THE CLAIM TO NORMATIVE AUTHORITY 
 
There is resistance to the idea that judicial institutions possess authority for the 
development of international law. Such a claim is seen as problematic precisely because the 
foundation for courts’ authority within a legal system usually subordinates them to the law-
creating actor: again, to use Hart’s paradigm, they are deputy to the legislature rather than 
deputy legislator (although Hart does foresee that when the rules run out, the latter is 
permissible). Judges shield their decisions through an outward show of judicial technique, 
behind which judges shield themselves from the accusation that they are engaging in law-
creation rather than merely the interpretation of the law. 
 
It behoves legal scholars to dispense with this fallacy. Interpretation remains primarily a 
purposeful activity; anyone who engages in the interpretative process does so with a desire to 
achieve a certain outcome.
87
 Whether or not judgments are a source of law or merely a means 
for the determination of the law,
88
 a court’s interpretation nevertheless contributes to the 
creation of what it finds.
89
 This occurs through a process of ‘normative accretion’,90 through 
which law is not created as with legislative processes, but rather in a more modest, 
incremental fashion, clarifying ambiguities and resolving perceived gaps in the law. The open 
texture of law—and especially of international law—gives judicial institutions heightened 
influence on the internal understanding of legal rules within the system, offering a set of 
normative expectations that can be relied upon by States. They are, to borrow a phrase from 
Christian Tams and Antonios Tzanakopoulos, agents in the international law-making 
process.
91
 Once a general statement on a legal principle or rule has been elucidated by a court, 
and channelled into the judicial form and buttressed by whatever authority that institution 
claims, both parties and non-parties cannot in good faith contest that general principle.
92
 
 
There is nothing radical about this; for example, one can turn to Kelsen’s interpretative 
theory, which sought to leave the ‘legal politics’93 of trying to divine the ‘right’ interpretation, 
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 Bianchi (n 5) 17. 
88
 The classic distinction is well-explained in G Schwarzenberger, International Law (3
rd
 edn Longmans 1957), 
vol I, 26-8. See also M Akehurst, ‘The Hierarchy of the Sources of International Law’ (1974-5) XLVII British 
Year Book of International Law 273, 280. 
89
 Venzke (n 13) 71.  
90
 T Buergenthal, ‘Lawmaking by the ICJ and Other International Courts’ in (2009) Proceedings of the 
American Society of International Law 403, 403. 
91
 CJ Tams and A Tzanakopoulos, ‘Barcelona Traction at 40: The ICJ as an Agent of Legal Development’ 
(2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 781, 784; CG Weeramantry, ‘The Function of the International 
Court of Justice in the Development of International Law’, (1997) 10 Leiden Journal of International Law 309, 
311. 
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 GG Fitzmaurice, ‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’, in Symbolae Verzijl 
(Martinus Nijhoff 1958) 153, 172-3, terms judicial decisions ‘quasi-formal’ sources of international law. 
Weeramantry (n 91) 321, goes further: the Court’s ‘role and duty must extend beyond the immediate case to the 
elucidation of relevant principles that have arisen for discussion in the context of the case, thereby helping in the 
development of the law.’ 
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 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (n 3) 353. 
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and situated interpretation instead as an act of cognition or of will. In this respect, he 
expressly endorsed the law-constitutive nature of judicial decisions, in so far as these 
constructed individual norms form the frame of the general norm of the law.
94
 This cognitive 
process may even take into account norms not of the positive law (morals, natural justice, 
‘constituting social values’). Due to the systemic role of law-applying organs, these are 
transformed into norms of positive law through the act of will or cognition by these organs: 
‘[t]he interpretation by the law-applying organ is always authentic. It creates law’.95 In this 
respect, ‘authentic interpretation’ must be understood as law-creative. It can possess a general 
character, in that it creates law not only for a concrete case but for all similar cases before it; 
but it is also authentic if it creates law only for an individual case, because as soon as the 
validity of the norm is justified through a final judgment by a law-applying organ, it is seen as 
an authentic interpretation (and thus to be distinguished from the interpretation of a private 
actor or a legal scholar).
96
 In this respect, Kelsen seems to accept the constitutive normative 
force of judicial decision-making: he even goes so far as to suggest that judicial interpretation 
is simply a form of legislation, the motives of judges for which being irrelevant for analytical 
positivists. Interpretation is thus no juristic analysis, but belongs to politics and sociology.
97
 
 
This is an important concession: it conceptualises the frame through which the act of 
interpretation or application of law by certain organs constitutes the law itself, thus turning the 
classical legal positivist posture on its head. 
 
Interestingly, the grasp towards coherence embodied by judicial techniques, such as 
giving reasons, or adhering to previous judicial decisions, is revelatory of the values and 
norms that are embedded within the legal system.
98
 yet the privileging of coherence as a value 
is the imposition of one view, not merely its ‘identification’: 
 
The interpretative techniques lawyers used to proceed from a text or a behaviour to its ‘meaning’ create 
(and do not ‘reflect’) those meanings … Hermeneutics, too, is a universalisation project, a set of 
hegemonic moves that make particular arguments or preferences because they seem, for example 
‘coherent’ with the ‘principles’ of the legal system … But they offer no … authentic translation of the 
‘raw’ preferences of social actors (into) universal law.99 
 
In suggesting that hierarchy, order and coherence are intrinsic to juristic thought, one arrives 
at the implied claim that juristic thought is inherently good, valuable. Yet as Beckett argues, 
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 Ibid 353. 
95
 Ibid 353-4. 
96
 Ibid 355-6: Kelsen denies this all force: because the filling of gaps in the law can only be performed by law-
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 Beckett, ‘Fragmentation, Openness, and Hegemony’ (n 78) 59. 
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 Ibid, referring to Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia (n 21), 597-8. 
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the attempt to introduce a meta-system to ensure coherence makes a necessarily hegemonic 
claim: it claims its own absolute truth (or a ‘neutrality amongst the other systems’); or ‘it 
internalises conflicts within and between systems into itself’.100  
 
As such, in a sense, any study of the rules of interpretation, which indeed is but a 
secondary topic in the light of the role of interpretation as a hermeneutic tool, necessarily 
extends further than the rules themselves, and must also study the practice of relevant law-
applying actors as an equally important locus for the construction of meaning. For it is the 
claim of law-applying actors to what Ingo Venzke calls ‘semantic authority’, or the capacity 
to influence and shape meanings as authoritative reference points in legal discourse’,101 that is 
equally important. The focus on interpretative authority opens a discussion on legal 
normativity, going beyond obligation and very much into the practice of international actors. 
Any such study might even address the conceptual disagreement as to the form of 
international law itself, a much wider project for all international lawyers. 
 
Yet with power comes responsibility: interpretation cannot just be reduced to the 
recognition of a norm’s meaning, nor by omnipresent and all-pervasive structures. The 
interpretative act, when undertaken by certain law-applying actors (and in particular judicial 
institutions), involves not only a considerable degree of freedom, but amounts to a claim to 
authority.
102
 In this respect, I defer to Julius Stone, who suggested that ‘[t]he important 
question is whether the tribunal will choose more wisely if it chooses in consciousness of its 
responsibility rather than in the belief that it has no choice open’.103 To reject judicial law-
creation may accord nicely with a traditional view on the ‘meta-law’ on sources: yet so to do 
eschews judicial responsibility for the interpretation given by a court. Concealed behind the 
‘assumed’, ‘implied’, or ‘imputed’ intention of the parties, judicial interpretation is given 
power or authority, but judicial institutions are not tasked with any responsibility for the law 
so created;
104
 and, to cite Stone again, ‘… to conceal creative power by fictions does not 
prevent its actual exercise’.105 
 
Lest we forget that judges are also human beings, not only acting to perpetuate their 
own power (although in fact, often very concerned with their prestige), but also normative 
actors conditioned by their legal upbringing and the career that brought them to the 
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international bench in the first place,
106
 one must be chary of placing undue weight on judicial 
interpretation as authoritative: 
 
Self-interested interpretation presented as authoritative or objective interpretation has been an essential 
ingredient of all patterns of domination, veiling oppressive and exploitative relationships in the guise of 
that which is ‘natural’ or ‘true’ or ‘necessary’.107 
 
Is there another way? Jason Beckett makes an interesting suggestion in the context of his 
thoughts on fragmentation, and I wonder whether they have relevance here: ‘we must learn to 
embrace this loss of control, or better still, to re-imagine it as an assumption of responsibility. 
Coherence, hierarchy, accommodation and other mechanisms of conflict displacement are, 
perhaps better understood as conflict denial, and thus of a refusal of responsibility’.108 In this 
regard, the impulse towards coherence is an attempt to refuse responsibility: by exercising 
semantic authority without claiming the authority to do so, judicial institutions can evade 
responsibility for the substance of the international legal order, and equally so, the 
international legal order—the embodiment of rationality and logic—can evade the 
responsibility for the substantive problems caused within the law itself. It is perhaps a step too 
far to isolate the judicial function fully from any responsibility for political choice; yet it is all 
too often it is the case, insulated in the reassuring positivism of ‘objectivity’, that judicial 
institutions exercise that political role described by Dworkin.  
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